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Is the Law Hopeful?
Forthcoming in H. Miyazaki and R. Swedberg, Hope in the Economy
Annelise Riles

∗

One of the central concerns of hope studies is the problem of living with, or under
capitalism. Genda Yuji draws attention to the difficulties people of various ages face to find the
motivation to continue to act as economically productive units within society (Genda 2005).
Gassan Hage describes a moral crisis in ordinary people’s lives surrounding how to respond to
the triumph of capitalism (Hage 2003). Naoki Kasuga analyzes the “freeter problem,” in which
Japanese young people refuse to join the full-time labor force, as a new kind of resistance which
is incomprehensible within both the framework of capitalism and its critiques (Kasuga, this
volume). Hirokazu Miyazaki considers how such diverse subjects as Japanese traders, Fijian
villagers and social theorists find the hope to continue in their respective roles in the global
capitalist system (Miyazaki 2004; 2006).
One common way of describing this problem is to say that what is at stake is the
instrumentalization of agency: human agency is rendered, within the capitalist system, as mere
instrument. In the hope studies literature, the problem is more often described as an intellectual,
moral, or political crisis in which something that once could be assumed or taken for granted,
such as workers’ faith that a life-long commitment to their employment will be justly rewarded,
has now been lost. Hence people are disempowered not simply by outside forces but internally,
by virtue of the fact that they have lost the energy or the motivation to go on.
As I understand it, one of the defining aspects of hope studies is that it addresses the
current moment explicitly in two dimensions at once: on the one hand, it aims to describe the
conditions of others’ hope. On the other hand, it aims to produce the conditions for scholarly
1
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hope, that is, to replicate others’ hope on an academic terrain in which there is a parallel loss of
confidence in the foundations and mission of social theory (Miyazaki 2004). By focusing on the
linkages between the problems of people in the world and of scholars in the academy, the hope
studies project also highlights the way the over-instrumentalization of the social sciences shuts
down many of the most challenging questions before they can be answered. Hence hope studies
scholars have shown interest in fiction as both a source of material about hope and as a model for
hopeful scholarship. Both Genda and Miyazaki draw inspiration from the work of the novelist
Ryû Murakami (1977; 1995; 2003; 2006; 2007), and in his larger project, Naoki Kasuga has
written extensively about crime fiction (e.g. 2005).
It is comparatively interesting that law as a discipline has suffered no crisis on par with
the crisis of social theory described by Hage and Miyazaki, and legal actors face no momentous
problem of how to go on, on par with those faced by the social actors studied by Genda, Kasuga
and others. This is despite generations of sophisticated efforts to create legal crisis through
critiques of the way law, as an instrument of capitalism, embodies and perpetuates social
inequality (Friedman 1973), for example, or, critiques of the indeterminacy of legal doctrine—
the fact that it can be used to produce or justify any outcome and hence gives legal actors no
guidance about how to decide at all (Unger 1986). Perhaps most directly relevant to the
concerns of Professors Genda and Kasuga is the boredom that some critical legal scholars have
expressed about legal argumentation. These scholars argue that they can no longer generate in
themselves the enthusiasm to participate in the endless repetition of the same battery of
arguments, the same playing out of old political and doctrinal positions (Kennedy 1997; Schlag
1995). One could say they are the freeters of the legal academy.1 But despite these small
pockets of freeterism, what is more surprising about law, given its close relationship to the social
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sciences and humanities, and given its location at the heart of capitalist instrumentalism, is that
there is not more exhaustion, more loss of hope.
Could we then talk about law as a hopeful discipline? It depends on the definition of hope
we adopt. Law is certainly not hopeful in the sense described by Richard Swedberg, of a “wish
for something to come true” (Swedberg, this volume). Indeed, law’s ability to deliver on specific
promises of social change has been famously described as “hollow hope” (Rosenberg 1991). If
lawyers hope, they do not hope for something so concretely and instrumentally defined. As I
have argued elsewhere, their knowledge is not oriented toward an outside target in that way,
even when it purports to have a specific aim such as social change or economic growth or the
rationalization of government resources in mind (Riles 2004).2 Law certainly is also not hopeful
if we have in mind Jonathan Lear’s notion of “radical hope” (Lear 2006); there is nothing very
radical about law at all. It is a much more mundane, ordinary technology than this. If we take
Genda Yuji’s understanding of hope as an attribute or asset of persons, likewise, I doubt we can
speak of law as hopeful since, as we will see, the “ability to go on” is understood as much as an
attribute of the techniques of law itself as of the lawyers who deploy them. But if we adopt
Miyazaki’s definition of hope as the “reorientation of knowledge” (2006: 149), described further
below, I believe we gain a useful vocabulary for understanding the power of legal practice, as
well as an agenda for replicating that power on other intellectual terrains.
As it turns out, fiction is not something external to law, but a core device of law itself.
Examples of legal fictions would be the treatment of the corporation as a person, or the common
law doctrine of coverture, which held that at marriage a wife merged into the person of her
husband. In the standard definition, a legal fiction is a factual statement a judge, a legal scholar
or a lawyer tells, while simultaneously understanding full well –and also understanding that the
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audience understands—that the statement is not fact. As Lon Fuller put it, a legal fiction is
“either (1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a
false statement recognized as having utility” (Fuller 1930a: 369). A legal fiction is not a lie
because “it is not intended to deceive” —it is known by all who use it to be false (Fuller 1930a:
367). It differs from a hypothesis for Fuller because there is no question of proving its truth.3
This also distinguishes a legal fiction from a legal presumption which at least takes the form of a
statement that can be rebutted.4
Some legal theorists now suggest that legal fictions, far from just helping to order social,
political or economic phenomena, actually constitute those phenomena by providing the frames
through which social actors apprehend social realities. For example, Yan Thomas’ research into
the techniques of legal fictions for managing inheritance funds in Roman law shows how “facts”
such as whether there was a death, or indeed whether there was a corpse, were matters produced
internally by legal argumentation, even as that argumentation itself turned on a divide between
matters of fact and matters of law: “Ce pouvoir--pouvoir de commander au réel en rompant
ostensiblement avec lui--governe à mon sens la compréhension que nous devons avoir du ius
civile antique” (Thomas 1995: 20). As Geoffrey Samuel (2004: 46) puts it, “What is
…interesting … is the extent to which models of traditional legal concepts act as schemes for
constructing the objects of legal science.” He gives the example of categories such as “person,”
“damage,” “thing” and “fault” which the law treats as facts, and which social actors treat as
social categories, but which are actually legal categories. Samuel terms these categories “virtual
facts” because “they are factual modes which transcend actual factual reality. Some kinds of
damage may not amount to ‘damage,’ while some types of things may not amount to a ‘thing.’”
In sum,
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The idea that legal science is a discourse that has its object in actual factual
situations is to misunderstand, fundamentally, legal thought. …[Law] functions as
much within the world of fact as within the world of law and it is this dual role
that endows it with its capacity to create virtual facts. Lawyers, like scientists, do
not work directly on reality but construct rationalized models of this reality, and it
is these models that become the ‘objects’ of legal discourse (Samuel 2004: 74).
The debate about legal fictions in legal studies then is not so much about how to go on
once what has long been assumed is lost, as in hope studies, but rather, how does something
come to be assumed in the first place, and what is the epistemological and political status of the
assumption? What are the techniques and sources of authority that bring those assumptions into
existence and allow them to carry on, as they pass from one lawyer’s hands to another? In other
words, what legal fictions help to bring to light is the technical source of law’s agentive power.
What this may contribute to the conversation about hope, in turn, is to rephrase concerns about
conditions of powerlessness under capitalism as a challenge to replicate the power of hope itself.
Let me begin from a more straightforward place, however, with the question of the
epistemological status of fiction in law and how it might speak to concerns about the overinstrumentalization of the capitalist world.

As If Instruments
The legal fiction has been the subject of a longstanding jurisprudential debate. Some
ardently defend the legal fiction as the very engine of progress in the law. Sir Henry Maine, for
example, celebrated the contributions of legal fictions to the evolution of law from Roman times
to the present. For him, legal fictions were one of three key institutions, alongside courts of
equity and legislatures, by which the law evolved in order to keep up with changes in society
(Maine 1864).5 The legal fiction has had equally powerful adversaries. Jeremy Bentham, for
example considered it the very opposite of ethical, transparent government. In this view, the
5

legal fiction is a device used by lawyers to pull the wool over everyone else’s eyes, on the way to
furthering their own class interests. If lawyers wished to change the law, in his view, they should
do so through their legislature, where the public has at least some degree of access, instead of
with a lawyerly wink and a nod:
It has never been employed to any purpose but the affording a justification for
something which otherwise would be unjustifiable. …It affords presumptive and
conclusive evidence of the mischievousness of the act of power in support of
which it is employed. …In every case, and throughout the whole field of
government, these instruments of mis-rule have had, as they could not but have
had, for their fabricators, the fraternity of lawyers” (Bentham and Bowring 1843
Vol IX, pp. 77-8)
Bentham’s position has many contemporary advocates. The constitutional theorist Cass
Sunstein, for example, has plainly argued that we need “principles, not fictions”—that legal
fictions are “unhelpful and in fact harmful to legal reasoning and results. Fictions are not
indispensable. The law would be better off without any of them” (Sunstein 1990:1256). But for
others, the fiction captures something paradigmatic about the nature of law itself. As the legal
realist Jerome Frank put it, on his way to a critique of what he viewed as the dogmatism of legal
formalism,
What, with unfortunately few exceptions, judges have failed to see is that, in a
sense, all legal rules, principles, precepts, concepts, standards--all generalized
statements of law--are fictions. In their application to any precise state of facts
they must be taken with a lively sense of their unexpressed qualifications, of their
purely "operational" character. Used without awareness of their artificial
character they become harmful dogmas (Frank 1970 (1930): 179).
What is at stake in this debate over creativity versus obfuscation is a certain
epistemological subtlety about the legal fiction. One early attempt to theorize the
epistemological foundations of legal fictions, Hans Vaihinger’s The Philosophy of “As If (2001
(1924)), has inspired generations of legal theory.6 Vaihinger’s larger argument concerns the use
of what he terms “As ifs,” in all aspects of knowledge, from mathematics to economics to
religion. An “As if” in Vaihinger’s terms is knowledge that is consciously false, and hence for
6

this very reason is irrefutable. Vaihinger draws attention to the delicate epistemological stance
of the “As if”—to its subtle, ambivalent, “tension.” The “As if” is neither true nor not true, he
insists, but rather is itself the tension between what is true and not true. It is this tension, for
Vaihinger, that it is the fountain of all growth in knowledge:
The ‘As if’ world, which is formed in this manner, the world of the “unreal” is
just as important as the world of the so-called real or actual (in the ordinary sense
of the word); indeed it is far more important for ethics and aesthetics (Vaihinger
2001 (1924): xlvii).7
Vaihinger calls for remaining open to what he terms the “As if” quality of knowledge rather than
critiquing its distance from reality: “We can only say that objective phenomena can be regarded
as if they behaved in such and such a way, and there is absolutely no justification for assuming
any dogmatic attitude and changing the ‘as if’ into a ‘that’” (2001: 81).
If the problem hope studies responds to, then, is a condition in which the longstanding
presumed bases of life and work to which social actors are committed—intellectual and
otherwise—no longer hold, then the legal fiction represents a different kind of commitment in
the first place, neither belief nor disbelief. After all, it is not a presumption but a fiction. And
indeed, Vaihinger’s tarrying toward the subjunctive of knowledge makes him an ideal talismanic
figure for humanistic attempts to dislodge certain kinds of empiricist claims in the social
sciences. In this view, the world of the unreal is just as important, just as true, as the world of the
real. For example, Edmund Leach, drawing on Vaihinger, indexed his own commitment to
theoretical models that he were admittedly “unreal” and “static” with the provocative phrase, “as
if” (Comaroff 1992: 23; Leach 1982; 1954), and the anthropologist Roy Wagner picked up on
the phrase As If, and on Vaihinger’s work on the nature of analogy, as fiction, to refer to
ethnography as a wider analogical task of seeing one thing as if it were another (Wagner 1986:
9).8
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For social theorists, the “As if,” like the turn to hope, has been seen as a position that
affords a certain pause from the instrumentalism of social analysis. Although I join those who
embrace Vaihinger’s text for its hopeful reorientation of social scientific knowledge, there is a
curious omission from these anti-instrumental readings of Vaihinger: For Vaihinger, the As if, or
the fiction, is at its core always and only a means to an end: “Thought, then, must be regarded as
a mechanism, as a machine, as an instrument in the service of life” (Vaihinger 2001 (1924): 5).9
It is on precisely this point, moreover, that lawyers have embraced Vaihinger. Vaihinger’s
insight about the instrumental nature of subjunctive truths crystallizes a kind of commonsense
among lawyers: the particular character of the legal fiction as an assertion of what is understood
always already to be false is that it is an explicit instrument, a device with a clearly defined
purpose, a means to an end. For Maine, for example, legal fictions, as tools of particular judges
working out individual cases, serve the larger social and historical purpose of legal reform. For
Bentham, in a converse way, although legal fictions may advance the interests of individual
litigants, the problem with legal fictions is not their epistemological status but rather the fact that
they serve no larger social purpose: “[The fiction] has never been employed but to a bad purpose.
It has never been employed to any purpose but the affording a justification for something which
otherwise would be unjustifiable” (Bentham and Bowring 1843: Vol. IX p.77). The two agree in
other words on the purposeful quality of the fiction; they disagree only on whether the ends
justify the means.
The fiction’s status as a relation of means to ends is central to lawyers’ own complicated
and delicate epistemological and ethical commitments, therefore. Lon Fuller focuses on the legal
fiction’s tool-like quality when he argues that at least one purpose of the legal fiction is as
technical abbreviation, a “convenient shorthand” (Fuller 1930b: 517), a marker or place-holder
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for the points at which legal thought reaches the limits of its own capacities. When a judge
adjudicating a dispute between divorcing spouses over how to treat frozen human embryos
resolves to treat the embryos as “quasi-property,” for example, is not as much to imagine them as
actually part human and part property as to the create a placeholder for the fact that we do not yet
know how to imagine embryos in relationship to existing legal categories of person and property
and to solve a practical dispute. The legal fiction is an instrument for getting over these kinds of
humps—a tool for leap-frogging over our own conceptual limitations, he argues. Nomi
Stolzenberg, drawing on psychoanalytic theory, updates Fuller by presenting the legal fiction as
a tool for dealing with anxiety surrounding the inherent uncertainty in the world (her example is
uncertainty about paternity) by foreclosing factual inquiry (2007: 343).
So the first contribution of a study of legal fictions to hope studies might be to redirect
our attention away from efforts to escape capitalist instrumentalism and towards the hopeful
quality of instrumentalism itself. And indeed, if the As if is something akin to hope, there is
evidence that it pervades the very capitalist institutions that some take as the source of global
hopelessness. As one of the grandfathers of international economic law long ago insisted, the
international economic order is an “as if” economic order (Röpke 1954: 227). Legal actors who
participate in the global financial markets must also be their proponents, for private governance
is understood by its proponents to be a fragile project. The ultimate concern of international
economic law is how to build an “economic order”—it does not “exist” at the outset. As
Hannoun (1995: 84) points out, the proliferation of fictions of all kinds in economic law is
particularly interesting because this is a field in which, according to its own ideology, the law
should mirror reality. In fact, Hannoun argues, the legal fictions of economic law show less
concern with the adequation of law and reality than with intervening technically in economic
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realities, to achieve certain objectives.10 In other words, economic law is less concerned with
mirroring reality than it seems. What the legal fictions of international economic law foreground
in Hannoun’s terms are not economic “realities,” but the effects of legal practice (“effets de la
pratique”) (1995: 93). The As If quality of global capitalism, moreover, depends on the As If
quality of legal knowledge.

Reorienting Legal Knowledge
But the motivation for this essay is the implications of Miyazaki’s idiosyncratic definition
of hope for an understanding of legal knowledge. In his argument, every kind of knowledge has
what he terms, a “directionality.” Social actors’ implicit or explicit appreciation of the
directionality of their knowledge leads them in turn to seek to “reorient” it, and this ability to see
the potential for reorientation in one’s knowledge is what Miyazaki terms “hope” (whether it is
hopeful or not in the commonsense understanding of the term) (Miyazaki 2004:11).
For example, the shared directionality of financial analysis for the traders he studied was
the directionality of economic time, in which actions in the present dictate the future. Actors are
constantly oriented toward predicting the future, but the future cannot ultimately be known until
it is too late, that is, it has become the present.11 Miyazaki describes how the trading team
leader’s constant contemplation of the temporal directionality of market analysis led him to
entertain a somewhat bizarre fantasy of creating a trading machine that could accurately predict
market movements into the future and hence replace human analysis altogether. In Miyazaki’s
definition, this surreal dream is “hopeful” (even if in a commonsense notion it is perhaps only
bizarre) because, having become aware of the directionality of time in trading analysis, in which
the future is constantly speculated upon from the point of view of the present, it entertains the
possibility of reversing that direction and reimagines the present from the point of view of the
10

future endpoint of speculative trading altogether (2006:167). Of course this machine never came
to be: Miyazaki argues that hope in the end is always disappointed (2004: 22), but this very
disappointment is in turn the engine of further hope, as it leads to further reversals. Hence any
act of hope is in fact always a replication of some other prior act of hope, elsewhere, on another
analytical terrain (2004: 25).
This technical definition of hope I think provides a useful vocabulary for explicating the
internal workings of the legal fiction, as it passes from the hands of one practitioner to the next.
Consider for example what happens when a friendly critic of the As If, the eminent American
legal realist Morris Cohen, manages to reverse its logic. Morris Cohen’s article, “On the Logic
of Fiction” (Cohen 1923),12 marks the emergence in the early twentieth century of a modernist
approach to the legal fiction. Cohen begins by attacking the “positivistic bias” in Aristotelian
logic that values ‘facts’ (1923: 477) and treats relations between facts as artifice. He contrasts
this view with what he terms the “modern relational view” in which “a complex of things-inrelation is the subject-matter of science” (1923: 483). From this point of view, Cohen raises an
objection to Vaihinger’s definition of a fiction as a statement that is false but nevertheless useful.
The objection is that such a statement assumes that there are facts in the world—true facts and
false facts—rather than analytical relations. The ultimate problem with Vaihinger’s
understanding of legal fictions, from Cohen’s point of view, is that the fiction—the analytical
relation that is also a judgment or legal resolution—is treated as the opposite of fact. A fiction
such as √-1 for example is not simply ‘false but useful’; it does exist in the world, if one accepts
that “besides things and their qualities,” the world includes also “relations and processes between
them” Cohen argues (1923: 486).
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In my view, the contribution of Cohen’s article to our understanding of legal fictions—
and more generally to a modernist conception of law—inheres in the kinds of reversals that
Miyazaki wishes to capture with the term “hope.” Like the trader studied by Miyazaki, Cohen
has a feel for the directionality of the centuries-long debate about legal fictions in the law: he is
aware, implicitly or explicitly, that the question of the epistemological status of the legal
fiction—is a statement such as “a corporation is a person” true or false?—turns on another
question, the question of political agency in law—is the answer to a legal question found or
made? In Cohen’s time, this latter question would have been highly charged, as the legal realist
movement in which he was a core figure worked hard to demonstrate that the law was not simply
a system of discovered logic but an artifact of judging, and hence judicial decisions invalidating
workers’ rights legislation, for example, were the matters of political choice.
From this realist perspective, whatever one might think of them, legal fictions were
artifacts of judicial power. In an article published in the Harvard Law Review in 1893, for
example, Oliver Mitchell argued that “Judicial fictions are, in truth, but the hand-maidens of the
only true judicial power—that of decision” (Mitchell 1893: 252) and as such were “but a species
of a much larger class of legal devices, which have been rendered necessary by the
unacknowledged character of the power of legislation exercised by the judges, which, as a
necessary consequence, entailed a resort to this principle of fiction” (1893: 261). To summarize,
“A legal fiction is a device which attempts to conceal the fact that a judicial decision is not in
harmony with the existing law. The only use and purpose, upon the last analysis, of any legal
fiction is to nominally conceal this fact that the law has undergone a change at the hands of the
judges” (Mitchell 1893: 262). Mitchell himself was a proponent of legal fictions and, unlike
Bentham, intended these observations as complement, rather than criticism.
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Cohen himself subscribed firmly to this understanding of the legal fiction, and indeed all
of legal reasoning, as political artifact. Some fictions could be characterized rather as
euphemisms, he argues—ways of avoiding explicitly stating the “disagreeable truth” that “judges
are not merely umpires but also make the law” (1923: 482). But where others saw in Vaihinger’s
claim that legal fictions are neither true nor untrue an opportunity to champion the claim that the
law is therefore nothing but a political artifact, it is precisely here that Cohen finds Vaihinger’s
approach inadequate. For Cohen, Vaihinger’s excessively positivistic distinction between reality
and fiction makes it impossible fully to appreciate the legal fiction as a political act, an act of
decision and not just an act of description. As Cohen puts it, “it would be absurd to regard these
fictions as false propositions. They are rather resolutions to extend certain legal rights” (Cohen
1923: 482). Abstractions (metaphors, or fictions—those things that are opposed to fact) then are
“methodologic resolutions, or determinations to look at objects in certain ways” (Cohen 1923:
483). Take, for example, the fiction of the Hobbesian social contract as a justification for initial
allocations of rights and duties in society. “It is… a great error to think that you can refute any of
the older natural-law theories by denying that the social contract with which they began ever
took place. The social contract is really not a hypothesis as to what actually happened, but a
concept of social transformation” (Cohen 1923: 487-88).
For Cohen, then, two strands in modernist legal debate are intertwined—the question of
the epistemological status of law leans on a question of the political status of law and vice versa.
He grasps the directionality of the argument, in Miyazaki’s terms —the way that each strand can
serve as a kind of foundation or support for the other. For example, Vaihinger’s seductive
epistemological flexibility of As If (as laudable as it is) is propped up by a fairly rigid notion of
political agency: the problematization of the distinction between what is real and what is artifice,
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what is truth and what is fiction is achieved at the expense of simplifying the difference between
what is found and what is made and treating the law simply as a man-made tool, an artifact of
human agency, an instrument.
But what is interesting is what happens next. Following Cohen’s awareness of the
directionality of this debate—of the way a claim about epistemology leans on a claim about the
agency of the judge—he suddenly reverses his own analysis, to make a surprising claim about
the agency of law: Vaihinger claims that fictions are made; they are the artifacts of creative
intellectual work, he says. But Cohen asks,
Did the Romans find or invent their legal system? We always speak of finding the
solution to all sorts of problems and even great mechanical inventors testify that
they find their inventions, that the sought-for-device sometimes ‘flashes upon
them,’ and most often they ‘stumble upon it’ while looking for something else
(Cohen 1923: 484-485).
This statement would have sounded like a scandal to Cohen’s realist colleagues bent on
demonstrating that it is the judge, and not the law, that has agency in legal decisions, and it
probably would have surprised even Cohen himself. Cohen’s attention to the dichotomy
between what is found and what is made in the law then suggests a different point of engagement
between legal studies and hope studies, around the question of the conditions for the abeyance of
legal agency. Just as, in Miyazaki’s analysis, hope can inhere in the way it is possible
momentarily to grasp how someone else’s agency can be the cause of one’s actions (Miyazaki
2004), Cohen asks us to query whether even within the context of an argument for the political
quality of law, we might also acknowledge the way that at particular moments legal knowledge
runs away from the knower, and becomes more than a tool in human hands.
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A Double As If
But note where Cohen’s surprising claim comes from: it is achieved simply by working
the standard, longstanding connection between the reality/artificiality of law and the
given/artifactual quality of law in reverse. That is, Cohen reverses Vaihinger’s logic of a
subjunctive epistemology propped against a standard understanding of legal agency, by giving us
a more subjunctive approach to legal agency propped against what was by that time the standard
modernist epistemology (the notion that relations are as real as the “things” they relate). The
ability to see one’s own agency in abeyance then is here the effect of a very specific kind of
move, the ability to turn the analysis around, or inside out (Riles 2000), in order to grasp another
possibility that is not external but internal to the legal form itself. Note that this feat is achieved
in Cohen’s article largely as a matter of intuitive lawyerly skill—it is just what good lawyers do,
just as turning financial knowledge around to see in it other possibilities is what good traders do,
for the traders Miyazaki studied.
In fact I want to take this a step further to suggest that this kind of reversal is best
understood as a routinized aspect of the usage of the legal fiction, what a legal fiction, as
practice, is. We can see this most clearly if we specify the standard definition of a legal fiction
quoted at the outset in the following way: a legal fiction is not just any false statement
understood by all to be false; it must take a particular form. When a judge asserts that at marriage
the wife merges into the person of her husband, for example, or that the corporation is a person,
the judge makes a legal conclusion, as Cohen points out—the conclusion that the woman loses
control over her property or that the corporation can enter into contracts or be held liable for
torts. But this conclusion is presented as if it were a factual claim: the wife is part of her
husband; the corporation is a person. A legal fiction is a legal conclusion—an act of judgment—
15

that takes the form of a factual statement: It is a theory presented as if it were a fact. What we
have then is a double “As if”: the As if of fact (the subjunctive assertion of a factual claim that is
known to be false—the woman merges into her husband) turns on the As if relationship of
judgment to fact itself—the legal conclusion that takes the form of a fact. And here we have the
trick of the device: for if the legal conclusion takes the form of a fact, the fact that is known by
all to be false, also becomes, in a sense, by operation of law, true: what else does it mean to say
that a corporation is a person than that a judge has drawn an analogy between the qualities of the
legal rights and obligations of the particular corporate entities in the dispute before him or her
and those of archetypal rights and obligations bearers—natural persons?
The remarkable agentive power of the legal fiction commented upon by contemporary
legal theorists then is not simply an artifact of the device’s epistemological complexity. Rather,
the power of the device inheres in the way it reorients a question of agency, by pairing it with a
question of epistemology. It redirects attention from the question of “who shall decide, and how
shall she decide?” to a question of “is the legal statement true or false?” From this point of view
we might more accurately describe the legal fiction as a technique of reorientation, that is, of
hope, in Miyazaki’s terms.

Replicating the Power of the Legal Fiction
Now it would be possible to rephrase the observations above in a modality of critique.
Indeed, the propensity to make the political nature of law disappear into a forest of complex
technical and epistemological arguments is precisely what critical legal theorists mean when they
refer to the “enchantment” of legal reasoning (Schlag 1998). In this view, legal reasoning
obfuscates a simple truth, that power lies outside, and not within, legal form. And it is on this
academic terrain that we find the most interesting parallel between legal studies and hope
16

studies, because these critiques of law’s enchantment participate in the same social theory
debates described as in crisis by Hage (2003), Miyazaki (2004) and others. The legal critiques,
for not wholly unrelated reasons, have suffered similar exhaustion. As in hope studies, critical
legal scholars now are asking, what should be the attitude of the sophisticated observer of law
after the failure of critique? The question here is essentially, can the (conservative) “hope” of law
be replicated on a (progressive) critical terrain?
To date, the resounding answer to this question has been “no.” For example, the legal
theorist Pierre Schlag has critiqued what he terms “‘as if’ jurisprudence” (1998: 109)—what he
describes as a sophisticated modern view of law, cognizant of all the epistemological and
political critiques, in which “when doctrines are said to bind or rights to trump, this means only
that the doctrines are to be understood as if they were binding and that rights are to be
understood as if they trumped other claims” (Schlag 1998: 110). Schlag explains,
The ambition of the sophisticated legal thinkers [who deploy as if legal reasoning]
(and it is not a small one) is to avoid the naïve metaphysics of objectivism and
subjectivism while nonetheless retaining the frame and force of these metaphysics
(1998: 112).
Schlag concludes that legal analysis, so understood, suffers “a certain authority deficit” (1998:
112):
If, as a result of contemporary antimetaphysical scruples, entities such as
principles, doctrines, values, rights are stripped of their subjective powers, then
their prior subjective power must be relocated elsewhere for law to retain its
authority. The question is where” (1998: 111)?
He offers an analogy to explain why this approach is ultimately doomed to fail: what if the Pope
were to state explicitly that angels do not exist, but that this is just an “as if” discourse, he asks.
This would leave the faithful unsatisfied. “Once the metaphysical illusion is gone, the pope’s
authority dissipates as well. The same thing goes for law” (Schlag 1998: 112).

17

Schlag’s point is that As If jurisprudence is either jurisprudence without power, without
authority, or it is a continuation of the same old politics of mystification, that is, submission to
legal form. If the As If jurisprudence is powerful, for Schlag, it is simply because it is a clever
way of reinstituting a belief in what is no longer believable; simply “the continuation of the same
old metaphysics by other means” (1998: 114). For example, the repetition of statements such as
‘the corporation is a person,’ even in a semi-ironic tone, perhaps makes other moves to extend
the powers of corporations such as giving them free speech rights to corporations seem more
politically palatable and logically defensible than it would be otherwise.
I want to query Schlag’s skepticism about As If jurisprudence, or what I would term the
replication of the very hope critiqued as mystification or enchantment, on one’s own critical
terrain, from one particular vantage point. My interest is in the picture he presents of legal
knowledge as a product, produced by some and consumed by others, and in which power inheres
in the production. As the discussion of debates in legal theory summarized above suggests, legal
scholars routinely direct their attention, positive and negative, to the inventors of legal fictions.
Perhaps commentators, who also fancy themselves to be original creators of new ideas, identify
most readily with this image of the creative judge, commentator or legislator. But is this a
satisfactory account of the workings of legal knowledge?
Consider for example one of the pinnacles of modern American property law, a doctrine
known as the Implied Warranty of Habitability. This doctrine in fact only dates to the 1970s.
Prior to this point, if tenants did not explicitly contract for rental property to be maintained up to
a minimum level of safety they had no recourse against their landlord and remained liable for
rent even if they fled the uninhabitable property. The traditional account of the doctrine is as
follows. Faced with a question of how to hold the landlord responsible for maintaining a level of
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safety he or she did not covenant to maintain in the lease, progressive judges responded by
inventing a legal fiction of an “implied warranty” under which it was deemed to be As If the
landlord and tenant had inserted a promise to maintain the apartment in safe condition into the
lease. In the law of property, this invention is imagined alternatively as the heroic or maniacal
action (depending on one’s political persuasion) of a handful of judges who, in a singular set of
politically charged decisions, forever changed the law. But although the invention of new legal
doctrines is one exciting location of legal fictions, it is not by any means the most common. This
focus on the judge as producer of legal fictions misrepresents legal practice and, in my view,
both overstates the political agency of judges and fails to give us a full account of the agentive
power of law.
Let me make this more concrete with an example of how this fiction passes from the
hands of teacher to student. When I teach a doctrine like the Implied Warranty for the first time
to new law students, they fight hard against the concept of “constructive intent”—how can it be,
they argue, that a judge can simply, by the stroke of a pen, state that the landlord intended
something which all parties know the landlord did not intend? It is an important part of my job,
as a trainer of novices, to fight the students to an “expert” understanding of the legal fiction as a
subjunctive modality of expression. But the next time the class encounters a doctrine of this
kind—say, when the students learn the doctrine of adverse possession under which one person’s
occupation of another person’s land for a given period of time without sufficient resistance from
the true owner will cause title to shift to the occupier—I need only say, “constructive intent” and
the students have “got it”: they type the phrase into their notes and move on. The creativity, the
second time around, is neither mine nor the students. In fact, there is no creativity at all. What
there is, instead, is the agentive power of the act of replication, as the device becomes the
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students’ as much as the teacher’s, and the students, thinking now “like a lawyer” also come to
belong to the device: the legal fiction “works” in a thin, shorthand, technical, way, to obviate (in
Wagner’s terms) or leapfrog over (in Fuller’s terms) the need for political conflict between
novice and expert or between proponent and critic of housing law reform.
What is ignored in the standard account of the development of American housing law, in
which one act of judging forever changes the law, is the afterlife of the fiction. In the decades
after the landmark case that brought the Implied Warranty of Habitability into existence, it is
passed from legal hand to legal hand, dissected in law review articles, invoked in the briefs of
countless housing lawyers, debated by generations of law students. This practice cannot
adequately be captured by a view of legal knowledge as produced by some and consumed by
others. We should rather say that legal knowledge comes into agentive being in the process of its
handing from one legal actor to another, and in that process it comes to constitute the very actors
that deploy it.
One of Schlag’s concerns is that As If jurisprudence unwittingly reinforces a naïve view
of legal truth. But note that in this example what matters is really not what the teacher and the
students believe to be the truth about the terms of the contract. What matters rather is the
practice, the move, the replication. Schlag errs, in other words, when he critiques the instability
of As If jurisprudence as if it were a truth claim, a theory. As Yan Thomas points out, a legal
fiction is not theory (“la pensée juridique”) but legal technique (“la technique du droit”), its own
way of doing things (“sa manière de faire”) (Thomas 1995: 18). The truth value of the legal
fiction is not simply ambiguous or subjunctive; it is actually quite irrelevant.
So where lies the authority of the legal fiction? Is it simply a tool of other external
interests, such as housing reform, or the academic stature of the legal theorist, or the authority of
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the teacher? In fact, the purposes for the creation of the legal fiction recede from view as students
replicate the practice. Vaihinger terms this phenomenon “the law of the preponderance of the
means over the ends.” He argues that in all aspects of human thought, in the course of the use of
As If devices as means to particular conceptual ends, the ends begin to recede from view as those
who use the tool come to focus rather on the means. In the example of the classroom discussion
described above, for example, the first and difficult discussion of constructive intent focused on
the social, political, and economic goals for having such a doctrine; the second, third and fourth
discussions focused only on the applicability of the doctrine of “constructive intent” itself. If by
power we mean, among other things, the ability to go on, then the power of law inheres in the
reception and replications it calls forth, as it passes from one set of legal hands to another. There
is no authority deficit here because pow13er is not a zero sum game. The replication, as
experienced by the students, is both empowered and empowering. I would like to claim this
power as a definition of hope, a reason for which we might say that the technical legal fiction is
hopeful. If the legal fiction is hopeful, then hope is power. From this perspective, the objective
might become not simply to document the hopelessness of the powerless, but to replicate the
power of hope.
The question then becomes, can legal authority be apprehended in any other modality
than either blind submission or critique? Miyazaki argues that hope cannot be analyzed. It can
only be “replicated on another terrain” of scholarship (2004: 25). Hence for him there is no
critical study of hope; there is only hopeful scholarship, that is, hope that replicates its subjects
hope through its own reversals of the directionality of academic knowledge. In this essay, I have
sought to engage in such an act of replication by reversing the directionality of critiques of la
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Notes
1

For a discussion of freeters and freeterism, see the chapters by Genda and Kasuga in this

volume.
2

Drawing on my analysis of legal knowledge, Miyazaki has argued (against Swedberg in my

view) that in any case such “hope in a predetermined end occludes home in the means” (2005:
289-90).
3

In this respect, a legal fiction also differs from the ideal typic models of Weberian social

science, in which the very point of the convention is to open up further inventive possibilities—
further challenges, modifications, critiques, or empirical tests. A legal fiction differs from what
social theorists term ideology also, since ideology is effective only if it is taken as a true
statement by at least some political actors.
4

As Yan Thomas puts it,
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La présomption intègre l'imperfection de la connaissance humaine, le droit
revêtant alors d'une apparence de certitude un probable qui ne peut être
éternellement débattu. La fiction procède d'une démarche résolument contraire,
même si les résultats auxquels elle conduit sont parfois empiriquement
comparables. Elle ne se contente pas de mettre un terme à la recherche due vrai:
c'est cette recherche même que, d'emblée, elle répudie. La fiction est une
négation du vrai manifeste; elle transgresse, pour le fonder autrement, l'ordre
même de la nature des choses....Avec la fiction, nous sommes en présence du
mystère le plus radicalement étranger à la pensée commune qu'offre, non pas la
pensée juridique, mais plus précisement la technique du droit, sa manière de faire,
l'ars iuris (Thomas 1995: 18).
For a contrasting view of the legal fiction as essentially identical to the legal
presumption, see Stolzenberg (2007).
5

For example, the legal fiction of adoption allowed Roman citizens to incorporate foreigners

into their communities while preserving the premise that kinship defined political allegiances.
Fictions “satisfy the desire for improvement, which is not quite wanting, at the same time that
they do not offend the superstitious disrelish for change that is always present,” he argued.
Without legal fictions, in other words, the law would stagnate—and hence would hold society
back by refusing to recognize in law changes long since recognized in society (1931: 22).
6

Lon Fuller enthusiastically embraced Vaihinger as the greatest of all thinkers about the nature

of legal fictions, and devoted the better part of his canonical work on legal fictions to a
straightforward summary and explication of Vaihinger’s text: “I am firmly convinced that a
study of Vaihinger will make one a better legal thinker” (Fuller 1930c 880 n. 177). Hans Kelsen,
likewise, drew heavily on Vaihinger in his own work on legal fictions, and Jerome Frank reads
Vaihinger (in a highly enthusiastic but fairly flat-footed way) to support his own view that the
law was full of “conceptual distortion” (Frank 1970 (1930): 342; see also Lichtman 1930-31).
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7

This subtle epistemological and aesthetic orientation has had many anthropological admirers.

Edmund Leach, drawing on Hans Vaihinger, many years ago indexed his own commitment to
admittedly “unreal” and “static” models in anthropological thought with the provocative phrase,
“as if” (Comaroff & Comaroff 1992: 23; Leach 1954: 5f). Roy Wagner later picked up on the
phrase, and on Vaihinger’s work on the nature of analogy, as fiction, to refer to the wider
analogical task of seeing one thing as if it were another. This could include not simply the as if
models of anthropological theory, but the “as if” nature of the ethnographic project itself:
A relative perspective within the province of cultural construction, taking the
referentialism of the symbol, the “is” of convention, as a kind of subjunctive, is to
enter a tentative suspension—Vaihinger’s world of “as if” (Wagner 1986: 9).
8

This could include not simply the as if models of anthropological theory, but the “as if” nature

of the ethnographic project itself in which ethnography becomes:
A relative perspective within the province of cultural construction, taking the
referentialism of the symbol, the “is” of convention, as a kind of subjunctive, is to
enter a tentative suspension—Vaihinger’s world of “as if” (Wagner 1986: 9).
9

The fiction is, in effect, only an elaboration or perfection of the larger instrumental quality of

all knowledge:
Thought is bent on continually perfecting itself and thus becomes a more and
more serviceable tool. For this purpose it expanded its province by inventing
instruments, like other natural activities….The natural function of thought, which
we spoke of above as a tool, also expands its instrumentality by the invention of
tools, means of thought, instruments of thought, one of which is [the fiction]
(Wagner 2001: 6).
It is this emphasis on the instrumental, purposive quality of the As If that distinguishes
Vaihinger’s work from the Kantian tradition and has led some to view him as a kind of
pragmatist: “It must be remembered that the object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the
portrayal of reality—that would be an utterly impossible task—but rather to provide us with an
instrument for finding our way about more easily in this world (Vaihinger 2001 (1924): 15).
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10

“Les fictions intellectuelles ne sont donc pas absentes du droit économique ; outre la diversité

de leurs sources, leur usage donne toutefois un contenu particulier au réalisme économique qui,
au-delà de la recherche affirmée de l’adéquation du droit au fait, se révèle également soucieux
d’efficacité technique pour la réalisation des buts poursuivis…l’effet d’un interventionnisme
juridique créatif destiné à informer la réalité, voire à la heurter, en fonction de ses objectifs …”
(Hannoun 1995: 90).
11

For example, he describes a debate between the financial traders he studied over whether

traders would be best rewarded or punished as a group for the successes or failures of the team as
a whole. This debate turned on yet another debate about whether the gains or losses associated
with trading should be reckoned on a short or long-term time horizon--if one took a short-term
view one supported individualized incentives while if one took a long-term view one supported
collective incentives.
12

Cohen writes here for a philosophy audience about the nature of ‘fiction’. He refers only in

passing to legal fictions, although it is clear that the argument is animated by his work on
property, contract and legal philosophy.
13
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